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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012 Nevada was described as the “embarrassment of the nation” when 
it comes to domestic violence.1 This dishonorable distinction derives in part 
from Nevada consistently ranking at or near the top of the list of states where 
domestic violence is most prevalent.2 Thanks to recent progressive strides in 
Nevada, however, domestic violence survivors are now able to terminate a 
lease to escape a violent relationship3 and are entitled to time off from work to 
address issues relating to a domestic violence incident.4 But there is more work 
to do. 
Domestic violence is “a violent crime committed in the context of an inti-
mate relationship.5 A recent survey by the American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers (AAML) suggests that domestic violence is becoming more prevalent 
between parties who have filed for divorce.6 And a majority of attorneys sur-
                                                        
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Neva-
da, Las Vegas. Big thanks to Khalon Richard, Anthony Defelice, and Africa Sanchez for 
lending me their ears and for their unwavering love and support. A mis padres: gracias por tu 
apoyo constante. Throughout this Note I aimed to write about domestic violence as responsi-
bly as possible by, to the extent practicable, humanizing domestic violence survivors and 
using active voice to attribute violence to their aggressors. This Note is dedicated to those 
women who will never see a remedy for the wrongs that they received. 
1  Tovin Lapan, Nevada Domestic Violence by the Numbers, LAS VEGAS SUN (Feb. 7, 2012, 
2:00 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2012/feb/07/nevada-domestic-violence-numbers/ 
[https://perma.cc/2GPF-UJZC]. 
2  Id. 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.345 (2017). 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.0198 (2017). 
5  NEV. ATTORNEY GEN., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESOURCES IN NEVADA, http://ag.nv.gov/Hot_ 
Topics/Victims/DV_Nevada [https://perma.cc/PU9B-BDUU] (last visited Aug. 22, 2018). 
6  AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON THE RISE SAY NATION’S TOP DIVORCE 
ATTORNEYS: MAJORITY FEEL COURTS NEED TO DO MORE, (Mar. 4, 2015), http://aaml.org/abo 
ut-the-academy/press/press-releases/domestic-violence/domestic-violence-rise-say-nation%E 
2%80%99s-top-div [https://perma.cc/6UAJ-D7K2]. 
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veyed by the AAML believe that the courts should do more to adequately ad-
dress this violence.7 
This Note advocates for a new Nevada bill that provides a more direct path 
to compensation for survivors of domestic violence that are seeking a divorce. 
The bill creates a rebuttable presumption that a domestic violence survivor in a 
divorce action is entitled to economic and noneconomic damages resulting 
from the domestic violence. Further, the proposed bill authorizes Nevada dis-
trict courts to compensate survivors directly from a married couple’s marital 
property. 
Part I will begin by discussing domestic violence statistics nationally and 
in Nevada. Part II will detail the history of the relevance of evidence relating to 
domestic violence in Nevada divorce proceedings. Part II will then discuss how 
the rules of practice in Nevada’s judicial districts and the Nevada Rules of Civil 
Procedure address the concerns that led the legislature to discourage the admis-
sion of evidence relating to domestic violence in divorce proceedings. The rela-
tionship between no-fault divorce and property division will be discussed in 
Part III. Part IV will detail the role that domestic violence plays in the divorce 
proceedings of other states. Part V will set forth my proposed bill and an ac-
companying explanation. And Part VI contains a short discussion about the po-
tential overlap between criminal restitution and family law. 
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT LARGE AND IN NEVADA 
A. The Difficulty in Collecting Data Related to Domestic Violence 
Domestic violence is a shadow crime. Many survivors of domestic vio-
lence do not come forward because of shame and embarrassment, and likely 
many more because of fear.8 Compounding the problem is the fact that there 
exists no national database recording incidents of domestic violence.9 
The absence of a national database makes domestic violence difficult to 
track. Information about domestic violence is gleaned from several sources, 
each of which collect only enough information to meet their agency’s specific 
objectives.10 For example, the CDC’s 2003 report on domestic violence sourced 
its information from: (1) hospitals, whose primary purpose for collecting in-
formation is to treat and bill patients, which leaves little incentive for hospital 
to obtain crucial information regarding the relationship of the survivor to the 
aggressor; and (2) police departments, whose primary purpose for collecting 
                                                        
7  Id. 
8  Jackie Valley, A Culture of Abuse: Nevada Ranks Among Worst States for Domestic Vio-
lence, LAS VEGAS SUN (Oct. 27, 2014, 2:00 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2014/oct/27/ 
culture-domestic-abuse-nevada-ranks-among-worst-/ [https://perma.cc/VXK3-2Q65]. 
9  Id. 
10  DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, COSTS OF 
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (Mar. 2003), https:// 
www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/IPVBook-a.pdf. 
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information is to apprehend the perpetrator, which leaves little incentive to col-
lect information about the survivor.11 
B. What We Know for Sure 
In 2014 the Las Vegas Sun reported that the Clark County District Attor-
ney’s Office receives approximately ten to twenty new cases of domestic vio-
lence each day.12 Shockingly, the likelihood that a woman living in Nevada will 
be assaulted by her partner is greater than the likelihood that a police officer 
will be assaulted while working.13 And Nevada women are more likely to be 
killed in domestic violence altercations than women from other states.14 
The Nevada Coalition to End Domestic and Sexual Violence (NCEDSV) 
releases statewide data collection reports of domestic violence.15 In 2017, there 
were a reported 47,368 adult and child victims of domestic violence in Neva-
da.16 Of those victims, 12,474 were employed full- or part-time, 4,025 were re-
ferred to a medical agency, and 6,584 were referred to housing services.17 
Spousal abuse accounted for 1,145 of those domestic violence incidents.18 And 
in 2016, NCEDSV identified twenty-four instances in Nevada where some-
one’s life was lost to domestic violence, including: “[sixteen] women and four 
men [] killed by partners or ex-partners,” “[t]hree men killed by the partners of 
or former partners of domestic violence victims,” and “[t]hree children [] killed 
in a family annihilation.”19 
Nationally, the picture is not much better. Half of all female homicide vic-
tims in the United States are killed by an intimate partner.20 When Congress 
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), it estimated that “[n]early 
[one-third] of American women report physical or sexual abuse by a husband 
                                                        
11  Id. 
12  Valley, supra note 8. 
13  PAMELA POWELL & MARILYN SMITH, UNIV. NEV. COOP. EXTENSION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: 
AN OVERVIEW (2011), https://www.unce.unr.edu/publications/files/cy/2011/fs1176.pdf. 
14  Wesley Juhl, Nevada Women More Likely Than Others to be Killed in Domestic Violence-
Related Shooting, Study Says, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Apr. 12, 2016, 9:22 PM), https://www.rev 
iewjournal.com/crime/homicides/nevada-women-more-likely-than-others-to-be-killed-in-
domestic-violence-related-shooting-study-says/ [https://perma.cc/JD4F-D2HL]. 
15  See generally NEV. COALITION TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, STATISTICS AND 
REPORTS, http://www.ncedsv.org/resources/statistics-and-reports/ [perma.cc/JBA4-YNHY] 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2018). 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  NEV. COALITION TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
HOMICIDES IN NEVADA 2016 3 https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-wUwMfE_GhPZ2NjdENX 
US1mOTQ/view [https://perma.cc/52Q8-LGXQ] (last visited Oct. 5, 2018). 
20  Camila Domonoske, CDC: Half of All Female Homicide Victims are Killed by Intimate 
Partners, NPR (July 21, 2017, 2:22 P.M.), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/0 
7/21/538518569/cdc-half-of-all-female-murder-victims-are-killed-by-intimate-partners [http 
s://perma.cc/S75A-7W7W]. 
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or boyfriend at some point in their lives.”21 Congress, additionally, found that 
“as many as [10 million] children witness domestic violence every year,” and 
that “[fifty] percent of men who frequently assaulted their wives also frequently 
abused their children.”22 
Domestic violence often results in injury requiring treatment. The National 
Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS) estimates that nearly 5.3 million 
intimate partner victimizations occur each year, which results in nearly 2 mil-
lion injuries.23 550,000 of those injuries required medical attention and 145,000 
warranted hospitalization for at least one night.24 Apart from physical injury, 
however, the CDC estimates that intimate partner violence results in “18.5 mil-
lion mental health care visits each year.”25 Roughly $4.1 billion is spent on 
medical and mental health care services for survivors of domestic violence.26 
And more broadly, the burdens linked to domestic violence include “adolescent 
pregnancy, unintended pregnancy in general, miscarriage, stillbirth, intrauterine 
hemorrhage, nutritional deficiency, abdominal pain . . . neurological disorders, 
chronic pain, disability, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder.”27 
It goes without saying that domestic violence has an impact on a survivor’s 
ability to work. According to the NVAWS, women lose almost 8 million days 
of paid work each year due to domestic violence.28 For homemakers, an addi-
tional 5.6 million days are lost from household chores.29 In total, the NVAWS 
estimates that intimate partner violence costs $8.3 billion annually in medical 
care and lost productivity.30 
These distressing statistics make clear: those who survive domestic vio-
lence suffer tangible economic and noneconomic losses. And those survivors 
should be fully compensated. 
                                                        
21  Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-162, § 201, 199 Stat. 2993 (2006). 
22  34 U.S.C. § 12461 (2018). 
23  DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 10, at 19. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. at 30. 
27  WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN: PREVALENCE AND HEALTH EFFECTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND NON-
PARTNER SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 21–22 (2013), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85239/1/ 
9789241564625_eng.pdf?ua=1. 
28  DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 10, at 1. 
29  Id. 
30  Robert Pearl, Domestic Violence: The Secret Killer that Costs $8.3 Billion Annually, 
FORBES (Dec. 5, 2013, 1:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2013/12/05/dome 
stic-violence-the-secret-killer-that-costs-8-3-billion-annually/#697319cf4681 [https://perma. 
cc/UG3V-L8NU]. 
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II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND NEVADA DIVORCE LAW 
Currently, Nevada district courts “may” consider domestic violence in 
making an unequal disposition of marital property, but only “[i]f spousal abuse 
or marital misconduct . . . has had an adverse economic impact on the other 
party.”31 The reason for this exclusion is based in part on the 67th Nevada Leg-
islature’s concern that testimony relating to the relative faults of the parties 
would have an adverse impact on children and could increase the cost of litiga-
tion.32 
A. From “Equitable” to “Equal” 
Prior to 1993, Nevada law allowed district courts to make an “equitable” 
disposition of community property.33 The Nevada Supreme Court, in fact, went 
as far as to write that there was not a judicially-created presumption favoring 
equal disposition of marital property, and neither was there a judicial mandate 
that property be divided in an “essentially equal manner.”34  
In 1993, however, the Nevada legislature amended Nevada’s property divi-
sion statute to remove the court’s ability to make an “equitable” disposition of 
property and instead require it to “make an equal disposition.”35 The amended 
statute contained an exception allowing the court to “make an unequal disposi-
tion of the community property . . . if the court finds a compelling reason to do 
so . . . .”36 When confronting the newly amended statute for the first time, the 
Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that by replacing the term “equitable” with 
“equal,” the legislature “deleted the equitable factors that formerly had to be 
applied by the courts in making a ‘just and equitable’ disposition of community 
property . . . .”37 Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the trial court was 
no longer permitted to consider “equitable” factors, but could still make an un-
equal disposition of marital assets if it found a “compelling reason” to do so.38 
The legislature did not define the term “compelling reason.”39 In the ab-
sence of a definition, the Nevada Supreme Court found that financial miscon-
                                                        
31  Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (Nev. 1997) (emphasis added). 
32  See Requires Equal Disposition of Community Property of Parties in Proceeding for Di-
vorce Under Certain Circumstances: Hearing on A.B. 347 Before the Assemb. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 1993 Leg., 67th Sess. (Nev. 1993) (statement by Sen. James). 
33  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(b)(2) (1989) (amended 1993) (requiring that the court make a 
division of property “as appears just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of 
the parties”). 
34  McNabney v. McNabney, 782 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Nev. 1989) (alteration in original). 
35  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(b)(1) (1989) (amending NRS 125.150(b)(1) (1989)) (amended 
by NRS 125.150(b)(1) (2017)) (requiring that the court, “to the extent practicable, make an 
equal disposition of the community property of the parties”). 
36  Id. 
37  Lofgren v. Lofgren, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (Nev. 1996). 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
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duct was one such “compelling reason” to divide marital property unequally.40 
In Lofgren v. Lofgren, Mr. Lofgren committed financial misconduct when he 
used marital funds for his own personal use and transferred other marital funds 
to his father.41 The trial court found that Mr. Lofgren’s actions were an attempt 
to avoid sharing money with his spouse.42 The trial court also found that, in to-
tal, Mr. Lofgren misappropriated $96,000.00 in community funds.43 In light of 
this financial misconduct, the trial court divided the marital property such that 
Ms. Lofgren was awarded $44,106.50 more than her one-half share of the re-
maining martial property.44 That additional monetary sum represented her one-
half interest in the money that Mr. Lofgren misappropriated.45 On appeal, the 
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award and held that Mr. 
Lofgren’s financial misconduct was a “compelling reason” to divide property 
unequally.46 
In another post-amendment case, the Nevada Supreme Court in Wheeler v. 
Upton-Wheeler reversed a trial court’s determination that spousal abuse or mar-
ital misconduct—standing alone—was a compelling reason to make an unequal 
division of marital assets.47 At the trial court level, Ms. Upton-Wheeler intro-
duced photographs into evidence showing that Mr. Wheeler’s violent behavior 
caused her “numerous” bruises.48 In light of the abuse, the trial court awarded 
Ms. Upton-Wheeler more than her one-half share in the marital property.49 
The Nevada Supreme Court, on appeal, emphasized that the 67th Nevada 
Legislature amended the language in the property division statute to require the 
court to make an “equal”—rather than an “equitable”—division of marital 
property.50 The Court noted that the reason for this change was the legislature’s 
belief that “testimony regarding the relative faults of the parties could have an 
adverse effect on the children and could increase the expense of litigation.”51 
Additionally, the Court also determined that the legislature hoped the amended 
statute would preserve Nevada’s status as a no-fault divorce state.52 
Based on this legislative history, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the 
substitution of the term “equitable” for “equal” meant that the Nevada legisla-
ture intended to omit evidence of marital misconduct from divorce proceed-
                                                        
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 298. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. at 297. 
47  Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (Nev. 1997). 
48  Id. at 201. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 203. 
51  Id. (citation omitted). 
52  Id. 
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ings.53 The Court further held that “except for a consideration of the economic 
consequences of spousal abuse or marital misconduct, evidence of spousal 
abuse or marital misconduct does not provide a compelling reason” to make 
“an unequal disposition of community property.”54 Under the new statute, then, 
the trial court could divide property unequally only “if” spousal abuse has an 
economic impact.55 
In sum, the 67th Nevada Legislature reasoned that exposure to evidence of 
domestic violence and marital misconduct has an adverse effect on children.56 
To ensure the safety of those children, the legislature sought to discourage 
spouses from introducing evidence of domestic violence by requiring that the 
court make a totally “equal” division of marital property.57 There was an excep-
tion to this rule “if” the domestic violence had an economic impact on the sur-
vivor.58 If the violence had an economic impact on the survivor, then this im-
pact constitutes a “compelling reason” to award the survivor more than his or 
her one-half share in the marital property.59 
B. The 67th Nevada Legislature’s Concerns Were Quickly Rendered Moot by 
the 68th Nevada Legislature 
Two years following the 67th Nevada Legislature’s decision to preclude 
the trial court from considering evidence of domestic violence when dividing 
property, the 68th Nevada Legislature determined that “domestic violence 
[was] on the rise.”60 It further determined that domestic violence was “the lead-
ing cause of serious injury to women—more than automobile accidents and as-
saults by strangers combined.”61 At a hearing on a bill to amend the custody 
statutes, Judge Charles McGee of the Second Judicial District Court testified 
that “family courts in Nevada speak out unanimously in favor of legislation 
which strips the presumptive right of joint custody of a perpetrator of domestic 
violence.”62 
Based on these determinations, the 68th Nevada Legislature amended the 
custody statutes to create a rebuttable presumption that it is not in a child’s 
                                                        
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Makes Various Changes to Provisions Relating to Domestic Violence: Hearing on A.B. 
378 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 1995 Leg., 68th Sess. 12 (Nev. 1995) (state-
ment of Assemb. Chris Giunchigliani). 
61  Id. 
62  Creates Rebuttable Presumption of Custody: Hearing on A.B. 395 Before the Assemb. 
Comm. on Judiciary, 1995 Leg., 68th Sess. 1886–87 (Nev. 1995) (statement of Judge 
Charles McGee, Second Judicial District Court). 
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“best interest” for the court to award sole or joint physical custody to a parent 
who is found by clear and convincing evidence to have committed “one or 
more acts of domestic violence” against a child or the parent of a child.63 Bear-
ing in mind that in resolving custody disputes “the sole consideration of the 
court” was—and today remains—“the best interest of the child,”64 the pre-
sumption against custody by the abusive parent created a powerful incentive for 
parents to introduce evidence of spousal abuse. In fact, the creation of the pre-
sumption can be interpreted to mean that the State encouraged parents to bring 
forth evidence of domestic violence. 
The court’s holding in Wheeler was premised upon the 67th Nevada Legis-
lature’s concern that “testimony regarding the relative faults of the parties 
could have an adverse effect on the children and could increase the expense of 
litigation.”65 But the 68th Nevada Legislature—by creating the rebuttable pre-
sumption in the custody statutes—rendered the 67th Nevada Legislature’s con-
cerns moot by incentivizing parents to come forth with evidence of domestic 
violence. Despite this shift in policy considerations, Wheeler and its reasoning 
remain precedent today: evidence of domestic violence may not be considered 
when dividing marital property, unless the violence has an economic impact on 
the survivor.66 
C. The 67th Nevada Legislature’s Concerns are Now Served by Local Rules 
of Practice and the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 
The local rules of practice adopted by Nevada’s judicial districts, and the 
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure minimize the risk that children will be ex-
posed to evidence of domestic violence. 
1. The Local Court Rules 
a. The Eighth Judicial District Court Rules 
The Eighth Judicial District Court, which covers Clark County—where the 
majority of Nevadans reside—has several rules protecting children from expo-
sure to evidence of domestic violence.67 Even before reaching the courtroom, 
                                                        
63  See A.B. 395, 1995 Leg., 68th Sess. (Nev. 1995) (amending NRS 125.480, Nevada’s 
then-custody statute). NRS 125.480 is now repealed, but the relevant language lives on in 
NRS 125C.0035 (2017). 
64  See A.B. 395, 1995 Leg., 68th Sess. (Nev. 1995); see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 125C.003(1) (2017). 
65  Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (Nev. 1997). 
66  Id. 
67  The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that Clark County has a population of over 2,200,000 
residents. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS: CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, https://www.censu 
s.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/clarkcountynevada/PST045217 [https://perma.cc/H9K4-T68X] 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2018). Washoe County is the next populous county, with an estimated 
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the Eighth Judicial District Court requires that all parents involved in a contest-
ed custody matter attend mediation through the Family Mediation Center.68 If 
the parties do not resolve their custody disputes during mediation and the case 
proceeds through litigation, then the divorcing spouses are required to take a 
seminar for separating parents.69 However, if the parents successfully resolve 
their custody disputes in mediation, the court may waive the seminar require-
ment; but it reserves jurisdiction to order the seminar post-judgment.70 
Once a complaint for divorce is filed, “all lawyers and litigants possessing 
knowledge of matters” heard by the family court—including divorce proceed-
ings—are prohibited from: 
(a) Discussing issues, proceedings, pleadings, or papers on file with the court 
with any minor child; 
(b) Allowing any minor child to review any such proceedings, pleadings, or pa-
pers or the record of the proceedings before the court, whether in the form of 
transcripts, audio or video recordings, or otherwise; 
(c) Leaving such materials in a place where it is likely or foreseeable that any 
minor child will access those materials; or 
(d) Knowingly permitting any other person to do any of the things enumerated in 
this rule, without the written consent of the parties or the permissions of the 
court.71 
Further, the court is authorized to appoint a Court Appointed Special Advocate 
(CASA).72 The CASA assists the court by providing information relating to 
“the children’s concerns, desires, and needs.”73 In theory, then, this assistance 
mostly obviates the need for children to testify in open court.74 To that end, any 
reports prepared by a CASA can be read only by the parties, their attorneys and 
staff, and experts that the attorneys deem necessary.75 And except by court or-
der, the CASA report cannot be made an exhibit to, or part of, the open court 
file.76 In fact, the report cannot be released even to the parties in the case.77 Fi-
nally, each CASA report is required to contain a “prominent notice” stating: 
                                                                                                                                
population of over 460,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS: WASHOE COUNTY, 
NEVADA, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/washoecountynevada/PST045217 [ht 
tps://perma.cc/W4LM-EDEX] (last visited Aug. 13, 2018). 
68  NEV. EIGHTH JUD. DIST. CT. R. 5.303. 
69  Id. 5.302. 
70  Id. 5.302(d)–(e). 
71  Id. 5.301. 
72  Id. 5.107(a). 
73  Id. 5.107(c)(2). 
74  Relatedly, a parent may not cause a child to be examined by a therapist or other profes-
sional for the purpose of obtaining an expert opinion for trial, except upon court order or 
agreement between the parties. Id. 5.305(a). 
75  Id. 5.304(a). 
76  Id. 5.304(b). 
77  Id. 5.304(c). 
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DO NOT COPY OR RELEASE THIS REPORT TO ANYONE, INCLUDING 
ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. NEVER DISCLOSE TO OR DISCUSS 
THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT WITH ANY MINOR CHILD.78 
b. The First Judicial District Court Rules 
Subject to certain exceptions, the First Judicial District Court requires that 
divorcing parents attend mediation to attempt to reach amicable divorce 
terms.79 The mediator is entitled to interview the child.80 Thus, the child’s 
wishes can be obtained before the parents even enter a courtroom. Further, the 
First Judicial District Court has a rule authorizing the appointment of a CASA 
in high-conflict divorce cases.81 
c. The Second Judicial District Court Rules 
The Second Judicial District Court “encourages [the] resolution” of divorce 
matters “through the family mediation program.”82 All new actions in the Sec-
ond Judicial District Court that “involve a dispute regarding child custody” 
must be “referred to mediation.”83 Also, the mediator is entitled to interview the 
parents’ children.84 
d. The Fourth Judicial District Court Rules 
In the Fourth Judicial District, no contested child custody matters may be 
set for trial without the parents having attended “Mediation and/or Child Advo-
cacy.”85 Child Custody Mediation requires the parties to actively participate in 
one or more meetings with a neutral mediator to try reaching an amicable cus-
tody resolution.86  
Further, “Child Advocacy” is “an investigation for the purposes of making 
a recommendation to the Court concerning a custody/visitation schedule 
. . . .”87 Child advocates interview persons with knowledge helpful for making a 
custody recommendation, including the children.88 The Child Advocacy rec-
ommendations must describe in detail the facts relied upon in making the rec-
ommendation.89 And the Fourth Judicial District Court requires that child ad-
                                                        
78  Id. 
79  NEV. FIRST JUD. DIST. CT. R. 25(1)(a). 
80  Id. 25(7)(c). 
81  Id. 26(6). 
82  NEV. SECOND JUD. DIST. CT. R. 52. 
83  Id. 53(a). 
84  Id. 53(7)(c). 
85  NEV. FOURTH JUD. DIST. CT. R. 5(4). 
86  See id. 5(5)(a)(1). 
87  Id. 5(5)(b)(1). 
88  See id. 5(5)(b)(2). 
89  See id. 5(5)(b)(3). 
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vocates be professionally qualified in the field of psychiatric mental health.90 
This district further requires litigants in divorce matters to take a course “to as-
sist parents in methods of protecting their children from the harmful effects fol-
lowing the separation of their parents.”91 
e. The Ninth Judicial District Court Rules 
The Ninth Judicial District Court generally requires that custody matters be 
referred to mediation.92 Like most other districts, the mediator is entitled to in-
terview the child.93 Further, the Ninth Judicial District Court authorizes the use 
of a CASA to represent the child’s interests.94 Finally, the Ninth Judicial Dis-
trict Court generally prohibits the presence of children at the courthouse for tri-
als, but a judge may interview a child in camera.95 
f. The Tenth Judicial District Court Rules 
The Tenth Judicial District Court forbids the presence of children at the 
courthouse for hearings or trials and authorizes the judge to interview the child 
in camera, if necessary.96 
2. The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 
NRCP 16.215(a) provides protections for children testifying in a divorce 
proceeding. The Rule instructs that the court “should find a balance between 
protecting the child, the statutory duty to consider the wishes of the child, and 
the probative value of the child’s input while ensuring to all parties their due 
process rights to challenge evidence . . . .”97 In determining whether a child 
witness may testify by alternative method—meaning that the child does not tes-
tify in person in an open forum, in the presence of the fact finder, or in the 
presence of the parties to the matter—NRCP 16.215(d)(1) incorporates the 
standards set forth in NRS 50.580, which governs the testimony of children in 
non-domestic cases.98 This rule states: 
In a noncriminal proceeding, the presiding officer may allow a child witness to 
testify by an alternative method if the presiding officer finds by a preponderance 
of the evidence that allowing the child to testify by an alternative method is nec-
                                                        
90  NEV. FOURTH JUD. DIST. CT. R. 5(5)(b)(5). 
91  Id. 5(9). 
92  NEV. NINTH JUD. DIST. CT. R. 26(a)(1). 
93  Id. 26(g)(3). 
94  Id. 30(a). 
95  See id. 30(e)(4); Id. 30(g). 
96  NEV. TENTH JUD. DIST. CT. R. 24(5). 
97  NEV. R. CIV. P. 16.215(a). 
98  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.520 (2017); NEV. R. CIV. P. 16.215(b)(1); Id. 16.215(d)(1). 
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essary to serve the best interests of the child or enable the child to communicate 
with the finder of fact.99 
* * * * 
In summary, through robust mediation requirements the rules of practice 
promulgated by Nevada’s judicial districts minimize the risk that parents will 
engage in prolonged and contentious divorce proceedings that harm children. 
The rules also forbid parents from discussing divorce proceedings with the 
children or from exposing the children to evidence used in those divorce pro-
ceedings. Further, CASA advocates, by obtaining the wishes of the child and 
providing that information to the court, obviate the need for children to testify 
in court proceedings. And if it becomes necessary to gather the testimony of a 
child, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure provide an avenue for the court to 
ascertain the child’s testimony outside the presence of the child’s parents. Thus, 
the local rules and the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure adequately address the 
67th Nevada Legislature’s concern about exposing children to evidence of mar-
ital misconduct. 
D. Maldonado v. Robles 
In an unpublished opinion interpreting Nevada’s post-amendment property 
division statute, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s order 
awarding Ms. Robles more than one-half of the marital property after the State 
convicted her husband of sexually molesting Ms. Robles’s daughters.100 The 
court found that Mr. Maldonado’s actions had a “continuing economic impact” 
on Ms. Robles because she: (1) required counseling to address the trauma of 
having her daughters sexually molested; (2) incurred expenses and lost wages 
from appearing at Mr. Maldonado’s numerous criminal proceedings; (3) in-
curred costs for medical bills, hospitalizations, and medications; and (4) was 
forced to move residences because the sexual abuse of her daughters occurred 
in her apartment.101 The court explicitly cited Wheeler in its holding and stated 
that Nevada trial courts can make an unequal disposition of property if it finds 
“a compelling reason” to do so.102 
This Note advocates that Maldonado’s holding—although involving mari-
tal misconduct in the form of abuse against children, rather than against a 
spouse—must be the rule, rather than the exception. Further, Nevada district 
courts must be enabled to divide property unevenly in response to domestic 
violence that is less egregious than the unfortunate violence that occurred in 
                                                        
99  NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.580(2) (2017). 
100  Maldonado v. Robles, No. 63732, 2015 WL 7356364, at *3 (Nev. Nov. 17, 2015) (stat-
ing that the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the trial court ruling for uneven distribution of 
assets in a divorce case). 
101  Id. 
102  Id. Notably, the opinion does not discuss whether there was evidence that Mr. Maldona-
do committed domestic violence against Ms. Robles. See id. 
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Maldonado. Although the injuries might differ in egregiousness, each injury is 
concrete and requires a remedy. 
III. NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND PROPERTY DIVISION 
Prior to the 1970’s, every jurisdiction in the United States required that di-
vorcing spouses proffer a fault-based reason for their split.103 The grounds for 
divorce included “adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful [sic] desertion, wilful [sic] 
neglect, habitual intemperance, conviction of a felony, or incurable insanity.”104 
In the wake of the Equal Rights Amendment, however, a movement began to 
change the existing statutory infrastructure in the hopes that a no-fault system 
would promote personal autonomy and minimize animosity between couples 
seeking divorce.105 
In 1970, California became the first American jurisdiction to adopt a no-
fault divorce law.106 And in 2010, New York became the final state to allow no-
fault divorce.107 Now, divorcing spouses in any American jurisdiction can prof-
fer a no-fault based reason for the divorce, usually something like “incompati-
bility”108 or an irretrievable breakdown of the marital relationship.109 But the 
question of what—if any—role fault should play in the division of marital 
property is far different.  
Prior to 1970, nearly all American jurisdictions permitted courts to consid-
er misconduct when dividing marital assets.110 However, 1970 saw the approval 
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (“UMDA”), a model law that une-
quivocally barred the consideration of fault in dividing property.111 The UMDA 
achieved its goal: a 1996 survey of the fifty states shows that around half of the 
states do not permit the consideration of fault in property division; fifteen other 
states do allow fault consideration; and the remainder of the states fall some-
where in between.112 
                                                        
103  Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 
79 (1991). 
104  Id. at 83 n.10. 
105  Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can Family Law Learn 
from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 62 (1991). 
106  Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 
291, 291 (1987). 
107  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney 2018); Nicholas Confessore & Anemona 
Hartocollis, Albany Approves No-Fault Divorce and Domestic Workers’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 1, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/nyregion/02albany.html [https://perma. 
cc/BYR2-JNCE]. 
108  E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010(3) (2017). 
109  E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 170(7) (McKinney 2018). 
110  Katharine T. Bartlett, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recom-
mendations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 39 (2001). 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 60–61. 
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The reasoning behind the exclusion of marital misconduct is difficult to pin 
down. After all, the concept of bodily integrity is held in such high regard that 
the United States Supreme Court has found a right to that integrity within the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution.113 But to be clear: the bill I propose 
would not bring fault-based divorce back to Nevada. The bill would leave in-
tact Nevada’s current grounds for divorce: (1) insanity; (2) lack of cohabitation 
for one year; or (3) incompatibility.114 Neither would the proposed bill require 
the court to look at the relative faults of the parties in dividing property. In-
stead, the bill merely allows survivors of domestic violence who have suffered 
economic and noneconomic injuries to be compensated directly from the mari-
tal property that the survivor shares with his or her spouse. 
IV. MARITAL MISCONDUCT AND PROPERTY: THE APPROACHES OF OTHER 
STATES 
A. New York 
New York domestic relations law provides that the trial court must “equi-
tably” distribute property amongst the parties.115 The statute requires the con-
sideration of several factors, among them being “the wasteful dissipation of as-
sets by either spouse,” and “any other factor which the court shall expressly 
find to be just and proper.”116 The party seeking the unequal disposition of mar-
ital property must satisfy a two-pronged test: (1) there must be a finding of 
“fault” and (2) a finding of “such adverse physical and/or psychological effect 
upon the innocent spouse so as to interfere with [his or] her ability to be, or to 
become self-supporting.”117 
In Wenzel, the trial court found that Mr. Wenzel struck, choked, and 
stabbed Ms. Wenzel, and engaged in behavior that caused her “severe emotion-
al anguish.”118 The most egregious incident of violence involved multiple stab-
bings and resulted in Mr. Wenzel leaving Ms. Wenzel for dead.119 Ms. Wenzel 
required hospitalization, surgery, and therapy.120 Further, Ms. Wenzel’s injuries 
left her with severe nerve damage, unable to support herself or her children, 
and on public assistance.121 
                                                        
113  See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673–74 (1977) (explaining that the right to be 
free from unjustified intrusions on personal security has always “been thought to encompass 
freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.”) (citation omitted). 
114  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (2017). 
115  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(c) (McKinney 2018). 
116  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(12) (McKinney 2018); id. § 236(B)(5)(d)(14). 
117  Wenzel v. Wenzel, 472 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833 (1984). 
118  Id. at 834. 
119  Id. at 833. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. at 834–35. 
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In light of those injuries, the trial court in Wenzel awarded Ms. Wenzel 100 
percent of Mr. Wenzel’s pension, 100 percent of the marital home, and the en-
tirety of the marital bank accounts and vehicles.122 In making the award, the tri-
al court stated that it was “not the repugnance or violence of the act itself that is 
the basis for fault to be considered as a factor” in dividing marital property.123 
Instead, it was the fact that the violence had a “detrimental effect upon the in-
nocent spouse,” adversely impacting her ability to become self-supporting.124 
B. Missouri 
Missouri law requires that the trial court, when dividing marital property, 
consider the economic position of each spouse, the contribution of each spouse 
to the acquisition of marital property, each spouse’s contribution as a home-
maker, the value of nonmartial property, each spouse’s conduct during the mar-
riage, and the custodial arrangements for the minor children.125 
In the Missouri case of Dodson v. Dodson, Mr. Dodson was involved in no 
less than seven extramarital affairs, resulting in the financial waste of the mari-
tal assets.126 Mr. Dodson’s extramarital partners would call the family’s home 
and harass Ms. Dodson.127 One affair forced the family to go into hiding to 
evade a woman who became upset when Mr. Dodson ended the affair.128 
Additionally, Ms. Dodson introduced evidence of numerous instances of 
physical and emotional abuse.129 For example, Mr. Dodson once picked up Ms. 
Dodson and threw her into the air, causing her to land in the “back of the 
truck.”130 In another instance, Mr. Dodson dragged Ms. Dodson by her hair 
across the carpet, leaving carpet burns all over her body.131 Additionally, Mr. 
Dodson sometimes locked Ms. Dodson in the family’s doghouse.132 In the most 
egregious instance, Mr. Dodson put a loaded pistol into Ms. Dodson’s mouth 
and threatened to kill her.133 
The Missouri trial court found that Mr. Dodson’s abuse placed “burdens on 
[Ms.] Dodson beyond the norms to be expected in the marital relationship.”134 
Based on this finding, the trial court awarded Ms. Dodson the entirety of the 
                                                        
122  Id. at 835–36, 838. 
123  Id. at 833. 
124  Id. 
125  MO. REV. STAT. § 452.330(1) (2018). 
126  Dodson v. Dodson, 904 S.W.2d 3, 4–5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
127  Id. at 5. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 8. 
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family home, a mobile home, a lot valued at $12,000, and a one-fourth interest 
in Mr. Dodson’s retirement fund.135 The award was affirmed on appeal.136 
C. Alabama 
Alabama’s divorce statute provides that—subject to the court ensuring it 
does not abuse its discretion—the trial court is not required “to award each par-
ty an equal portion of commonly-used assets.”137 Rather, the division of assets 
must be done “according to the particular circumstances of the case.”138 
The trial court in Crowe v. Crowe awarded the majority of the marital real 
and personal property to Ms. Crowe.139 Ms. Crowe worked for thirty-four of 
the parties’ thirty-eight-year marriage, and the court found that the couple 
avoided financial ruin because of Ms. Crowe’s deft financial management.140 
Conversely, Mr. Crowe worked only sporadically and was treated for alcohol-
ism several times throughout the marriage.141 
Further, the court noted that under Alabama law, the proffering of a no-
fault basis for divorce does not preclude the court from considering “the fault 
of the parties.”142 Accordingly, the court considered the fact that over the par-
ties’ marriage, Mr. Crowe physically abused Ms. Crowe through most of the 
children’s childhood.143 Based on these circumstances, the trial court awarded 
Ms. Crowe “substantially all of the marital assets,” including antique furniture, 
the entirety of her retirement pension, and one-half of the marital residence.144 
V. PROPOSED BILL AND EXPLANATION 
The aim of this bill is to help address Nevada’s woefully high rate of do-
mestic violence by deterring perpetrators of domestic violence, while also aid-
ing survivors of domestic violence in their rehabilitation. However, the bill also 
aims to ensure that the division of marital property goes only as far as neces-
sary to compensate the survivor. 
A. The Bill 
An act relating to domestic relations that authorizes the trial court to award an 
unequal disposition of marital property to compensate a survivor of domestic vi-
olence who suffered such violence at the hands of his or her spouse. 
                                                        
135  Id. at 5. 
136  Id. at 10. 
137  Crowe v. Crowe, 602 So. 2d 441, 443 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). 
138  Id. 
139  Id. at 442. 
140  Id. at 443. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. at 442. 
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Section 1. NRS 125.150 is hereby amended to read as follows: 
1. In granting a divorce, the court: 
(a) May award such alimony to the wife or to the husband, in a specified princi-
pal sum or as specified periodic payments, as appears just and equitable; and 
(b) Shall, to the extent practicable, make an equal disposition of the marital 
property of the parties, except that the court may make an unequal disposition of 
the marital property in such proportions as it deems just if the court finds a com-
pelling reason to do so and sets forth in writing the reasons for making the une-
qual disposition145; 
(c) There is a presumption that a spouse who proves by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that he or she has suffered an act or acts of domestic violence by 
his or her spouse within two years before the filing of the complaint for divorce 
has shown a “compelling reason” to make an unequal disposition of the mari-
tal property, but only to the extent necessary to make the abused spouse whole 
for economic and non-economic damages resulting from the abuse, including: 
(1) medical costs for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of health conditions 
related to the act(s) of domestic violence that occurred within two years prior 
to the filing of the complaint for divorce and are proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence; 
(2) wages not paid by the employer for days missed from work for those 
reasons set forth in NRS 608.0198(2)(a); 
(3) pain and suffering resulting from the act(s) of domestic violence that 
occurred within two years prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce and 
that are proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
(d) The district court shall, to the extent practicable, distinguish between 
actions taken by a spouse to defend themselves from an act of domestic vio-
lence, and acts of domestic violence promulgated by the primary aggressor. 
(e) A court making an award to a domestic violence survivor under this 
section must set forth the specific findings that formed the basis for the award. 
B. Explanation 
1. Animating Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler 
The proposed bill compensates a survivor of domestic violence by allowing 
the district court to compensate the survivor for the adverse consequences that 
routinely follow such violence. The bill, then, animates Wheeler’s central 
premise of allowing for a division of assets when violence “has had an adverse 
economic impact.”146 
Further, the presumption in the bill codifies the simple fact that domestic 
violence almost always has adverse financial consequences for the survivor. 
Rather than Upton-Wheeler’s permissive approach allowing the court to con-
                                                        
145  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(1) (2017) (citations omitted). 
146  Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (Nev. 1997). 
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sider whether domestic violence has had an economic impact on a spouse, the 
bill would presume a survivor’s right to be made whole for domestic violence 
he or she has suffered. 
The bill also works in tandem with another statute to fill a gap in the pro-
tection of domestic violence survivors. Ratified in 2017, NRS 608.0198 allows 
domestic violence survivors to take time off from work to resolve issues relat-
ing to an act of domestic violence.147 The statute allows survivors to take time 
off from work for “the diagnosis, care or treatment of a health condition,” to 
“obtain counseling,” and to “participate in any court proceedings” related to the 
violent incident.148 An employer is not permitted to retaliate against an employ-
ee for taking time off from work for the reasons enumerated in the statute.149 
However, the statute allows for the time off to be “paid or unpaid by the em-
ployer.”150 Accordingly, a survivor of domestic violence who lacks financial 
means might not invoke NRS 608.0198 if she cannot spare the wages that will 
go unpaid. Section 2(c)(2) of the proposed bill aims fill this gap in protection 
by imposing the financial burden of unpaid work on the domestic violence ag-
gressor, so long as the survivor is missing work for those reasons set forth in 
NRS 608.0198(2)(a). 
2. Clear and convincing evidence 
The clear and convincing evidentiary standard is one that family law litiga-
tors will be very familiar with. It is the same evidentiary standard that Nevada 
currently requires to prove that a parent committed an act of domestic violence 
against the child or a parent of the child, which triggers a rebuttable presump-
tion joint or sole custody by that parent is not in the child’s best interest.151 A 
survivor’s claim under the bill can be litigated in tandem with a claim for pri-
mary physical custody deriving from abuse against a spouse or child. 
3. Requirement for written findings 
The underlying goal of the proposed bill is to seek compensation for the 
domestic violence survivor, but not at the cost of accuracy. The requirement for 
written findings aims to ensure that the judgment and discretion of the trial 
court is well reasoned and capable of review. This requirement is analogous to 
the current requirement that the trial court set forth written findings if it finds 
sufficient evidence to give rise to a presumption that it is not in a child’s best 
interest for one parent to have sole or joint physical custody.152 
                                                        
147  NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.0198(1) (2017). 
148  Id. §§ 608.0198(2)(a)(1)–(3). 
149  Id. § 608.0198(3)(c). 
150  Id. § 608.0198(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
151  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.003(1)(c) (2017). 
152  See id. § 125C.230(1). 
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VI. OVERLAP BETWEEN CRIMINAL RESTITUTION AND FAMILY LAW 
The proposed bill compensates a survivor for harm resulting from an act 
that is potentially criminal under state and federal law.153 And under federal 
law, certain domestic violence survivors are automatically entitled to “the full 
amount” of their losses.154 Thus, the possibility of double recovery cannot be 
ignored. However, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Ma-
jor v. State.155 
In Major, the defendant was accused of child abuse, resulting in his ar-
rest.156 The family court ordered the defendant to pay $100 of child support 
each month to Social Services, which cared for the defendant’s daughter fol-
lowing his arrest.157 In the criminal proceedings—before a court different from 
the one that ordered the child support award to Social Services—the defendant 
pleaded guilty to felony child abuse.158 Subsequently, Social Services sought 
$20,362.07 in restitution, which represented the cost of caring for the defend-
ant’s daughter for seven months.159 The court hearing the criminal matter 
granted the request for restitution, but deducted the amount by $700, which rep-
resented the seven months of child support that the family court ordered the de-
fendant to pay Social Services.160 The defendant opposed the award and argued 
that because the family court had already entered an order for child support, the 
criminal court lacked jurisdiction to enter another cost-of-care order.161 
The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the restitution 
award.162 The Court noted the overlap between the family court’s authority to 
impose a support obligation and the criminal court’s authority to impose resti-
tution, each for “the same occurrence.”163 But the Court held that “[s]uch an 
overlap need not undermine the jurisdiction” of either court, so long as the 
courts take care to avoid double compensation.164 
Under my proposed bill, then, a court presiding over a criminal domestic 
violence matter may, in theory, still award restitution, so long as it takes care to 
ensure that the survivor is not doubly compensated. The principles of res judi-
cata would still apply, however, and a domestic violence survivor would not be 
permitted to collaterally attack a family court’s judgment. 
                                                        
153  18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.485 (2017). 
154  18 U.S.C. § 2264(b)(1) (2018). 
155  Major v. State, 333 P.3d 235, 237 (Nev. 2014). 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. at 238–39. 
163  Id. at 238. 
164  Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The 67th Nevada Legislature’s efforts were noble, but misguided. The in-
clusion of evidence relating to domestic violence is now commonplace in fami-
ly law litigation, and that evidence is crucial to ensure that district courts are 
apprised of all the facts relevant to a child’s safety. But apart from its relevance 
to the safety of children, evidence of domestic violence in divorce proceedings 
can help the court address a pressing human rights issue. The proposed bill 
would be a meaningful step towards ensuring that domestic violence survivors 
are fitted with the tools necessary for their rehabilitation and ability to move on 
with their lives. Until every abuser is forced to compensate the victim that they 
harmed, there will be no true parity. Changing Nevada’s property division 
standard in accordance with the proposed bill would mean that property divi-
sion in Nevada will have gone from equitable, to equal, and then more equal. 
